Eight Bits of Trust: eMudhra's CA keys cracked in milliseconds(scotthelme.co.uk)
927 points by hkc 4 days ago | 456 comments
tl;dr: eMudhra issued eight intermediate CA certificates in April 2025 whose P-384 private keys were tiny single-byte numbers (like 4, 56, 115), making them recoverable from the public certs in milliseconds. Browsers like Chrome and Firefox have blocked the intermediates and are protected by Certificate Transparency, but non-browser TLS clients (curl, Python, Node, Go, IoT devices, CI/CD pipelines, Windows code-signing) typically don't check revocation or CT and remain vulnerable until bundles are updated—or, for frozen-firmware devices, until the certs expire in 2039. eMudhra attributes the incident to a buggy key-ceremony script and human error.
HN Discussion:
  • ↑Detection method was trivial using off-the-shelf Google paranoid_crypto tooling
  • ↑The CA trust system is bloated and overly permissive with too many trusted CAs
  • ↑Updating ca-bundles is insufficient; containers, Flatpaks, and IoT devices remain exposed
  • ↑Structural fixes like DANE, CT checking in non-browser clients, and name constraints are needed
  • •Compromised keys could be repurposed productively to jailbreak unpatchable IoT devices