Spaghettifying DRAM(github.com)
706 points by matt_d 8 days ago | 173 comments
tl;dr: Researcher Christopher Domas demonstrates that flipping bits in AMD Family 16h's DRAM controller (MCT/DCT) address-translation registers rewires physical-to-DRAM mappings on the fly, creating aliases that bypass every memory-protection mechanism sitting above the memory controller. Since the scrambling is a GF(2) linear map, an SMT solver like z3 can reconstruct the transform from a few sentinel writes, yielding read/write access to normally fenced regions: PSP/fTPM memory, SMRAM, the C6 idle-state stash, and even live CPU microcode. The technique likely generalizes to Intel, ARM, and RISC-V memory controllers, threatening TEEs like SEV, SGX, TDX, and TrustZone.
HN Discussion:
  • Admiration for Domas as a hacker and anticipation for his Black Hat talk
  • DRAM complexity has grown massive, making such attack surfaces unsurprising
  • Questioning the scope and relevance since the demo targets old AMD Jaguar hardware
  • ~Skepticism about the practical threat since it requires ring-0/root access already
  • Criticism of the LLM-generated writeup style detracting from the work's presentation